Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1967

Frank H. Fullmer, David H. Fullmer, and Willard L.
Fullmer, dba Fullmer Brothers, A Partnership v.
Pacific Indemnity Company, A California
Corporation and Fred A. Moreton & Company, A
Utah Corporation : Brief of Defendant and
Appellant

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Skeen, Worsley, Snow and Christensen; Attorneys for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Fullmer v. Pacific Indemnity, No. 10839 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4021

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In the Supreme Court of Iha Stale of Utah
FRANK H. FULLMER, DAVID H.
FULLMER, and WILLARD L.
FULLMER, dba FULLMER
BROTHERS, a partnership,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.
PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY,
,,.,-.:.
a (]alifornia Corporation,
I

Defendant and .Appell<m't;
L

Case No.
10839

! t .r. D

and
1, 1 1
FRED A. MORE:TON & COMPANY,
' 1-;,; 1~!1967
a Utah Corporation,
----~;- ,-----;.-----------...
Defenda!nt. . .,

vli,'>r.. rne

c~~ri;-(Ti~--

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT
Appeal from the Summary J udgm.ent of
The Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW
& CHRISTENSEN
701 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
.Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT
331 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Respondents

INDEX
NATURE OF THE CASE ________________________________ _

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ___________________________ _

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL_____________________________

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS __ ________ ______ ___ _____________

2

ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
FULLMER BROTHERS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF DUTY TO DEFEND.

9

CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------- __________ _

- 22

CASES CITED
Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P. 2d 266
( 1962) -- ---- --- ---- -- ---------- -------- ---------------------------------- --------- Heyward v. American Casualty Co., (Pa. D.C.) 129 F. Supp.
4, 8 - -

------------------

---------------- ------------------------------ ---

20
14

Kidman v. White, 14 Utah 2d 142, 378 P. 2d 898 (1963) _________ 19
Plewe Construction Co. v. Franklin National Ins. Co., 11 Utah
2d 403, 360 P. 2d 599 (1961) ___________ ---------------------------- ___ _ 21
Tengren v. Ingalls, 12 Utah 2d 388, 367 P. 2d 179 (1961) ______

19

United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Northwestern National Ins. Co.,
et al. 185 F. 2d 443 (10th Cir., 1950) ________ ---------------

!l

Volf v. Ocean Accident and Guaranty Corp. (Calif., 1958)
------------ ----- ----------------- - ---------- - - 12
325 p_ 2d 987
AUTHORITIES CITED
50 ALR 2d 458, 472 ________________________ ------------------ -------------------------- 10
7A Appleman Insurance Law and Practice

~4683 _______

-

17

In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah
FRANK H. FDLLMER, DAVID H.
FrLLMER, and \VILLARD L.
FCLLi\II~R, dha FULLMER
BR( J11 HERS, a partner::-;hip,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY,
a ( 'alifornia Corporation,

Case Xo.

D<'fendant and Appellant,
and

FRED A. MORETON & COMP ANY,

a Utah Corporation,

Defendant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLAN'r

'rhis is a suit by Fullmer Brothers, general contractors, for a declaratory ,judg1rnmt determining, among
other tJ1ings, that Pacific Indemnity Company by reason
of a certain comprehensive liability policy is obligated
to defrnd a suit brought by Prudential Federal Savings
& Loan Association against Fullmer Brotlwrs and other
<l<'frndants arising out of thP eonstruction of the Prudential Building at 115 South Main Street in Salt Lake City,
Ctah, now pending in the District Court at Balt Lak<'
County, Ptah.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, Judge Stewart M. Hanson, granted plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment on the limited issue of
duty to defend. From that Summary Judgment defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the Summary Judgment
and denial of plaintiffs' l\fotion for Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Fullmer Brothers was the general contractor in the
construction of the Prudential Building at 115 South
:Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. Fullmer Brothers
('mployed Allen Steel Company and Nels Mettome as
suhcontractors for the fabrication and erection of tlw
required steel framework for the building.
During the course of construction of the building it
lwcame necessary to repair and remedy the steel framework in order to complete construction. Prudential FedPral Savings & Loan Association claims to have additional
eonstruction eosts and to have h('Pn dela_\Ted in occupaney
h_\· reason of such repairs.
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Prudential brought suit m the Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, Civil No. 150,73-1-,
against Allen Steel Company, the architect Pen--ira and
Associates, and Fullmer Brothers for damages alleged
to have resulted from the non-performance or dPfrctive
performance of the construrtion contract.
Fullmer Brothers tendered the defense of the Prudential suit to Pacific Indemnity Company which had
issued a comprehensive liability policy to Fullmer
Brothers for this particular construction projPct.
The Complaint (R-71) in the Prudential :mit allPged
that:

\.I.
"Defendants Fullmer and Allen, and each of
them, :::;o negligently welded, fabricated, erected
and bolted together and ieaused to be welded,
fabricated, erected and bolted together the structural steel work for said building so as proximately to cause the structural steel work to be
defective, unsafe and dangerous for the purpose
intended, including the support of said building,
and so as proximately thereby to cause the hereinaftpr dt>scribed damages to Prudential. (R-73,
7+).

\ 'IJ.
"Defendants Pereira, Fullmer and Allen so
negligently supPrvised, inspected, approved and
certified the welding, fabrication, erection and
bolting togPtlwr of thP structural steel work for
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said building so as proximat<:>ly to cause the structural steel work to be defective, unsafe and dangerous for the purpose intended, including the
support of said building, and so as proximately
thereby to cause thl' hereinafter described damages to Prudential. (R-74).

YTIT.
"As a proximatr result of the aforesaid acts
and omissions of defendants, and each of them,
Prudential was required to and did remove and
replace defective welds and did cause to be performed other remedial and other corrective work
on the steel framework of said building, all of
which delayed the occupancy of said building by
Prudential for a period of approximately six
months. The cost to Prudential of removing and
replacing said welds and of said other remedial
and corrective work was the approximate sum of
$907,-1-24.31, which sum represents and is the
reasonable eost, as presently known, of said renwdial and corrective work. The damage and
loss sustained by Prudential as a direct and proximatf' result of the delayed occupancy of said
building and the resultant loss of use as presently
known, is the approximate sum of $86,450. Prudential reserves the right to amend the amount
of damage it has herein alleged when the exact
amount of damage has been ascertained. (R-H).
* " '~

XII.
"During the perfonnancP of 'York required
of it undPr the terms of said contract, Fullmer
furnished and cmisecl to be furnished and in-
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stalled structural steel girders and columns which
had been welded, fabricated and inspected in such
an improper and unworkmanlike manner as to
render said girders and columns defective, unsafe,
dangerous and unusable for the purposes intended, included the support of the building. In
addition, Fullmer caused and permitted the structural steel girders and columns to be erected and
bolted together in such an improper and unworkmanlike manner as to render said girders and
columns defective, unsafe, dangerous and unusable for the purposes intended, including the support of the building.

XIII.
"By reason of the aforesaid acts and omissions to act, Fullmer hreaehed said eontract in
that Fullmer failed to execute and perform the
work in confonnity with the contract.

XTY.
"After said girders and eolumns had been
<Tected and bolted together and it was discovered
that said girders and columns were defeetive,
unsafo, dangerous and unusable, and had been
furnished and installed contrary to the provisions
of the said rontract, Prudential was required to
and it did cause to be performed remedial and
eorr<:>ctive work on said girders and columns, and
the occupaney of said building was thereby delav<•d for a period of approximately six months
h~rause of tlw ne«:essity of performance of said
rPmNlial and rorrertive work. ... (R-75, 76)."
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Pacific Indemnity Company declined the tender of
defense on the ground that the claims asserted by Prudential were not covered by its comprehensive liability
policy. This refusal was based upon the insuring agreements and exclusions set out below.
The policy under which the plaintiff was insured is
a "comprehensive liability policy." Under the policy,
Pacific Indemnity Company undertook:
"Coverage C - Property Damage LiabilityExeept Automobile.
"To pay on behalf of the immred (Fulhner
Brothers) all sums which the insured shall beeome legally obligated to pay as damages because
of injury to or destruction of property, ineludini.;
the loss of use thereof, caused by accident.
"Defense, Settlement, Supplementary Payments
"\Vith respect to such insurance as is afforded
hy this policy, the company shall:
"(a) defend any suit against the insured alleging such injury, sickness, diseas<>
or destruction and seeking damages on account thereof, Pven if such suit is groundless,
false or fraudulent; but the company may
make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems
t'xpedient: ''
The Broad Form Property Damage Endorsement provided (R-Hl):
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"rf 1 !1is po1iey dOPs not app1y:

(a) to liability assumed by tli<· insured
under any contract or agreenwnt exrPpt
under rove rages A and C, ( 1) a rontraf't as
defined herein or (2) as respects tlw insurancP which is afforded hy the Products Hazard as dPfined, a \\'arranty of goods or
prodnrts:
* * *
(j)

Fnder roverage C,

( 1) to injury to or destruetion of
property O\\'ned or O<:'cupied hy or rPnt('(l
to the insured,
(2) to injury to or destruetion of
any µ;oods, products or containers then•of manufactured, sold, handled or distri hut<>d or Jir<>rnises ali(:>nated h>- th<·
na111Pd insnrf'd out of whieh the a{·C'idPnt arisPs,
* *
>'if.

( -1-) to injmy to or destruction of
pro1wrty, the n•storation, repair or rPplacPrnPnt of \d1ich has been made or is
m•epssary h>· rPason of faulty workmanship then•on h>· or on behalf of the ms n red,
(I) to injury to or dt>struction of
pro1wrty in tlw care, rustody or control
of tlw insurt>d which is to he installed,
Pl'Pdt>d or ns<•d in C'onstruction by tht·
insurPd,
( 8)
to injury to or destruction of
that pnrtienlnr pnrt of an>· propert>· upon
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which operations are being performed by
or on behalf of the insured at the time
of the injury thereto or destruction thereof, arising out of such operations, or
(9) to liability assumed by contract
for penalties or liquidated damages arising out of an agreement to perform work
or services, or, the liability of the insured
for a br(>ach of a contract, other than a
warranty of goods or products as defined
sub-section (f) of condition 3 of the
policy.''
In support of their l\fotion for Summary Judgment,
Fullmer Brothers offered the Complaint in the Prudential case and the insurance policy and argued that as
a matt0r of law Pacific Indemnity Company was obligated
to def Pnd whether or not a <lnty to indPnmify in fact
PXi Stf'<l.
Pacifir Indemnity Company, in opposition to the
Motion offered tlw Affi<lavit of Harold G. Christensen
<letajling the facts "·hich would he shown by the evidence,
tlw contracts between Prudential and Fullmer Brothers
lwfore and aftpr the occurrPncP and thP Answers of Fullmer BrothPrs to Interrogatories. Pacific Indemnity Company arguPd that plaintiff was not entitled to defense
on tlw basis of thP Complaint in thP Prudential suit and
that therP were genuinP issues a8 to material facts. Nevertheless, the court, by Summary Judgment, ordered Paeific Indemnity Company to defend the Prudential suit
on behalf of Fullrn<>r RrothPrs. This appr'al followt>d.
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ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
FULLl\[ER BROTHERS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
.JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF DUTY TO DI~FEND.
It is a well esablished rule in the law of liahilit>insurance that the duty to defend a claim against thP
insured extends only to c>laims covered hy thP policy.
United Pacific Ins. Co. v. NorthwPstern Nn.timl(/l
Ills. Co., et al., 185 F.2d 443 (10 Cir., 1950), is the only
dPcision applying the law of Utah relative to duty to
(kf Pnd revealed hy our research. This case involved an
action for d<>claratory judgnwnt instituted hy United
PaC'ifie Jnsuranc<> Company against tlw insured and
otlwrs to eonstnw and d<>terrnine liabilities and rights of
th(' partiPs nnd<>r an ownPr's, landlord's and tenant's
liability insnranu• policy. The District Court of Utah
found a dut>- to defend and a\\-arcled attorneys' fees
against th<> insuranc1· eompan)-. ThP C'irC'uit Court of
.\ppeals n•v<•rs<'d stating at -1--1-~:

"The contract provides that: 'As respects such
insurance as is afforded hy the other terms of
this policy, the company shall: (a) defend in his
name and lwhalf any suit against the insured
alleging iomth injury or destruction and seeking
dmnag·(•s on account thereof, eYen if sueh snit is
!2:rnnndlPss, falsP or framlnl<>nt ... ·
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·'The rule is that under such provisions, the
company is bound to defend only suits alleging a
cause of action which brings the case within the
coverage of the policy. The company is not bound
to defend any action not falling within the coveragP of tlw policy.''
This rule is also set forth in the annotation entitled
"Allegations in Third Person Actions Against Insureds
as Determining Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend."
50 A.L.R. 2d 4-58 at 472 where it is stated:
" . . . a liability insurance company has no
duty to defend a suit brought hy a third party
against the insured where the petition or complaint in such suit upon its face alleges a state
of facts which fails to bring the case within thr
eoveragP of thP policy. ConsPquently, tlw company
is not requirPd to defend if it would not he hound
to indP11mify the insured evPn though th<• <'laim
aµ:ainst hirn should lll"<>vail in that aetion."
The Complaint in the Prudential suit allPges iwglig<mt rwrfor111anc<-> and breach of a construction contract
rPquiring remedial and rorrective work and delaying
<)('<'111 >an<'~-.

This is hut anotlwr ,,-ay of saying that Fullmer
Brothers has breached its contract. The function of a
JffOperty damage liability insurance policy is to protect
the insured against legal liahilit~- lwcause of in.jury t0
property.
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rrhr Complaint in the Prudential suit doPS not statP
a claim of legal liahility hecam;;e of injury to property.
Prudential does not claim its property was injun·d; it
claims Fullmer BrothPrs did not perform ib eontract.
A liability insurance policy is not a guarantee of the
insured's workmanship or his performance. \V orkmanship and performance are contractual duties under tlw
construction contract between Fullmer BrothPrn and Prudential. Protection against defective performance or
non-performance of a construction contract is the function of a performance bond, not that of a liability policy.

If there were any doubt as to the meaning of the
insuring- clause, it is removed hy the express language
of the Pxclusions. Tlw Pxclusions statP unPquivocally
that tlw polic:' do<•s not appl:':
I. To liahility for lm•aeh of contract. Exelusions (a) and (j)(~l):
->
To property ownP<l or oe<·upiPd hy Fullnwr Brothers. Exclusion (j) ( 1);

3. To goods manufactured, sold or handled
h:' FulhnPr Brotlwrs. Exclusion (j) ( 2) ;

+. To pro1wrty, the restoration, repair or
replacement of which has been made or is necessarv bv reason of faulty workmanship thereon
by ~r ~n ht>lialf of "B'ulln;Pr BrothPrs. Exclusion
(.i) (--1-)

:

12
;J. To pro1wrt.v to lw installed or used which
is in the car0, eustody or control of Fullmrr
BrotlH•rs. Exclusion ( j ). (7) : and

To pro1wrt:v upon which operations are
lwing performed h~· or on hehalf of Fullmer
Brothers arisiniz- ont of such operations. gxclns ion ( j) ( 8).
fi.

discussing thesP exdusions, a view of the suhjPct in the context of a decision may lw m;eful.
Befort~

In rolf

'1;.

Ocean Accident and Guaranty Corp.

(Calif., 1958) 3:25 P.:2d 987, a ease very similar on its
facts to the present case, Volf, a general contractor,
undertook to construct a stucco house for Hoover. Rhortl~·

lwfore tlw huilding was complPt<>d and J>OSSPssion

tak<>n

h~·

HooYPr, cracks apJH><H<'d in the 0Xtf'rior stucro

()f tl1P building-. It was found that although tlw stueeo

was of th<• right mixturP, tl11· base eoats W<-'l'<-' helow tlw
<·mnpressivP stn•ngih requirPd and that tlw cra<'king ha<l
o<-<·mTed in tlws<· has<• <·oat:-.

Th<-' dPfPndant irnmrancP company had issued to \T olf
a eomprehpnsiv<-' liability poliey that covered, among
other things, th<> liability of Yolf for "damag<-'s hPcausP
of in.inn· to or dPstruetion of pro1wrty, ineluding the
loss of us<-' tl1PrPof, caus<•d

h~·

aeeid<•nt," wl1irl1 is tlw

lang1iai.;1· of th<' poli<'Y in tlH· pn•s<•nt eas1•.
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The policy in the Volf case also contained various
exclusions, one of which provided that the poli<'y did not
apply to injury to or destruction of
(3) ... property in the care, custody or control
of the insured, or ( 4) any goods or products manuctured or sold, handled or distributed ... bv the
named insured, for work completed by . . -_ the
named insured, out of which the accident arises

"

V olf was found liable for replacement of the stucco,
and he then brought this action to recover the cost of
such replwcement. The trial court held in favor of V olf.
The California Supreme Court in reversing the trial
court's decision said at page 988:
''\Ve agrt-e with defendant that the injury
was excluded under 'Exclusion (g)' of the policy,
even if it is assumed that it was otherv.'ise included under coverage D. Since the defective
cement ·was used and the cracks appeared in the
stucco while V olf was constructing the house and
before Hoover took possession, the loss was occasioned by 'injury to . . . property in the care,
custody or control of the insured' and is therefore excluded under Exclusion (g) (3). The injury
is also excluded under Exclusion (g) (4), for it
\\'as to a product 'manufactured, sold, handled or
distributed ... by the named insured' as well as
to 'work completed by ... the named insured.'"
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Th(• eonrt \\·Pnt on to :-;tat(• that:

'To n·ad tlw polic·>· to <'OV(•r t]w loss hPn·
invo]v(•d wonld n·qnir(• that Exeln:-;ion (µ;) lw
ornitt(•d from thP polic>·, hut thP PvidPJl('(• doP:-;
not show, nor do plaintiffs' dailll, that th(•y ar"
Pntitkd to a rPfonnation of th1• 1>o]iev 0111ittinir
.
""
Exeln:-:ion (g)."
In tll<' l'olf easP <'V<'n without t]l<' explicit ]angua~P
of Pacific lnclt•nmity Company's En<lor:·wnwnt, t111• California Suprenw Court ohspn·pd that "tlw policy will not
prntl'et tlw insurt>d if hP has to n•pair or replaeP somP
produet or \\·ork whieh prov<'d dPf<'etiv<' and cauRPd an
a<·<·id(•nt," eitinµ; lle111rard r. A 111l'ri('(111 r1as11olf11 r'o ..
( Pa., TH'.) 1~9 F. ~npp. -L ~.
ThP public· poliey arµ:rn1H·nt to support this rnlP hardly rn·<'d h(• statPd. If a eontraetor ('onld havP his <l<'frrtiw
\\·ork n·pair<'<l by his insuraneP c·mnpan>·, thPrP is littlP
indn<'PlllPnt for prop(•J' JlPrfonmUH'P <'XC'<'pt pridP of
\\·ork111amd1ip, a vani:-d1ing- ln1111an trait. A Slll'Pt>· under
a IH'l'fonnanc·p bond has J'P<'ml!':-;(• aµ:ain:-:t th!' eontrador:
n liahi lit~· in:-:nn·r <lcw:-: not.
\\'!' ,,·ill now c·onsid!'r thP syweifi<' <·xelusion:-: m Pa-

<"ific· lrn]P11111it»

C0111pm1~··:-: poli<·~-.

Exelnsion ( .i) ( 1) (•x<·l\Hl(•:-;

i11.jur~;

to or dPstruetion

of prop1·rt~· o\\·1w<l or o<·enpi!'d \,y th(' insnn•cl.

'T'lll'
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plaintiffs were general contractors in possession of the
property upon which the building was being constructed
and in possession of the building itself as well as the
matPrials and the equipnwnt used in construetion.
Exclusion (j) (2) excludes injury to or dPstruction
of goods or products manufactured, sold or handled by
the insured. As in the Volf case, supra, thf' building
heing constructed by Fullmer Brothers came within the
lani.,ruage of this exielusion. The plaintiffs in the present
case were selling a product - the completed building including fabricated steels beams contained within that
huilding. The Prudential Building and its component
materials were manufactured, handled and sold by the
plaintiffs.
Ex("lusion (j) (-1-) exeludes precisely the claims which
arf' assertt>d in tlw Prudential suit. The policy does not
eOYf'r "injury to or destrucion of property, the restoration, rf'pair or replacement of which has been made or
i:-: nPe<>ssary by reason of fault~' workmanship thereon
by or 011 lH'half of the insured.'" ('l'lw underscored lang-uag-P includ<>s subcontractors.)
Tlw complaint in the Prudential case manifests the
fact that the claim against the plaintiffs herein is for
fouJt~~ workmanship by and on behalf of the insured.
"Defendants Fullmer and Allen and each of
tlt<>m, so n<>gligentl~, welded, fabricated, eri>cted
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and bolted together ... the stnrntural steel work
for said building so as proximately to cause the
structural steel work to be defective, unsafe and
dangerous for the purpose intended . . . (R-73,
74 ).
"As a proximate result of the aforesaid acts
and omissions of defendants, and each of them,
Prudential was required to and did remove and
replace defective welds and to cause to be performed other remedial and corrective work ...
(R-74)."
Plaintiffs' Answers to Defendant's Interrogatories
(R-117) establish that all of the claims made by Prudential against Fullmer Brothers result from restoration,
repair or replacement of materials made necessary by
tlw alleged faulty workmanship of Fullmer Brothers,
Allen Steel Company or Nels Mettorne on behalf of
Fullmer Brothrs. Prudential is clearly suing Fullmer
Brothers for damages resulting from an mJury whirh
is squan--ly within this policy exclusion.
Exclusion (j) (7) excludes injury to or destruction
of property in thP car<', custody or control of the insured
which is to he installed, ereeted or used in construction
by the insured. Exclusion (j) (.S) applies to injury to or
destruction of that particular part of any property upon
which operations ar!:' heing performed by or on behalf
of tlw insured at the tinw of the injury to or destruction
thereof, arising out of such operations. Plaintiffs, as
O'eneral contractors of tlH' Prndential Building had tht>
I">
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care, custody and control of all of the property and all
operations thereon, whether the operations wPre perfornwd by Fullmer Brothers or by someone Plse on their
behalf. It was at the time such operations wPre being
performed (when weight was being placed on thP structural stPPl) that tlw prohlPm with the bPams oc-c>urrPd
An insurance company has no duty to dPf end an
action against the insured where the allegations of the
Complaint against the insured disclose a claim which iR
outside the coverage of the policy. This rule is exprPssed
in 7 A Appleman Insurance Law and Practice §-1683 at
page -1--1-5:
" ... An insurer cannot be called upon to defond a suit against the insured where the petition
or complaint upon its face alleges a state of facts
excluded from the policy."
As previously pointed out, the gravearnen of the
Complaint in tlw Prudential suit is breach of the construction contract betwPen Prudential and FullmN
Brothers. Breach of contract is not covered by the
insuring agreement and also is exprf>ssly excluded by
Exclusions (a) and (j) (9).
Even if it he assumed that the Prudential claim is
hast>d upon legal liability for negligent damage to propPrty of Prudential, coverage for such damage would be
PxcludPd by Exclusion ( j) of the liability policy and
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specifieally by (j)(1), (-1-), (7) and (S) of the policy as
<liseussPd ahov<'.
Tlw lowPr court failPd to apply settlrd legal prin<'iplt>s wlwn it ordered Pacific Indemnity Company to
defond tlw Prudc>ntial suit. At the very lPast, therP were
genuine issues of matrrial fact prPcluding summary judglllPnt.

Pacific Indemnity Company showed through the
supplNnental contrach; that the rights and liability of
Prudential and Fullmer Brothers' were contractual in
nature and were so viewed after the oecurrence. (Ex.
D2 and D~, page ~).
Paeifie lnde11mity Company showPd through FulllllN Brothers Answers to lnterrngatoriPs that the elairn:;
of Prudt>ntial are for rPnwdial work. (R 117-1:20). If
Fnlhner Brothers say not, this is a fart dispnt('.
Paeifie Jndeumity Company showPd that Fullmer
Brotlwrs had genPral rnanaw·11wnt of the construction
pro.i<'('t. (Ex. D-1, page -1-). 'l'he plt>adings and files in
this easf• show that any elairned damage was to tlw
building- under <·onstrurtion and that n•storation, repair
or replaeP11wnt wa:-; elairnPd to havP lwPn n•quirPd h~·
rPason of f anlty workman:-;hip hy Fnll11wr Brothers or

hY otlwrs on its he half.
tlws<· ar<' fad disput1•:;.

If Fnlh1H·r Hrotlwrs :-;ay not.

The attitude of this Court toward summary ,judgnwnts has heen set forth in many
. decisions . Indeed ' one
,,-onders whether the procedure has t>liminated as mueh
]Pgal proc€c•dure as it has spavmed.
'

In Tfngren 1/. Ingalls, 12 Utah 2d 388, 3G7 P.2d 179
(1901) this Court stated at page 184:
"The sustaining of summary motions without
affording the party an opportunity to present his
evidence is a stringent measure which courts
should be reluctant to grant. It should he borne
in mind that although disposing of a case on such
a motion may seem an easy and expeditious method of dealing with litigation, it may not in fact
he so. Unless the court feels a high degree of
assurance that such ruling is correct, it may result
in <lPfeating that purpose and actually protracting the litigation hy requiring an appeal and then
having a trial which have been had in the first
plaee. Accordingly, the privilege of presenting
Pvidence should be denied only when, taking the
view most favorable to the parties' claims, he
C'ould not in any event establish a right to redrt>ss
under the law; and unlt>ss it dearly so appears,
doubts should he resolved in favor of permitting
him to go to trial."
8Pe abo Kidnutn

.(.(9~

White, 14 Utah 2d 142, 378 P.2d
( 19(i;3) where the eourt said at pagP 900:
i·.

"In confronting the problem presented on this
appN11. we have lw<•n ohliged to remain aware
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that a sum11mry judgnwnt, which turns a party
out of eourt without an opportunity to present his
evidPncP, is a harsh mt>asurP that should hP
grantPd onl)- wh<>n, taking tlw viPw most favorablP to a parti(:'s' claims and any proof that might
pro1wrly b<> adducPd tlwrPundPr, lH· could in no
PVPnt prevail. That both partiPs hereto mak{~
plam;ible arguments that the contract in question
is so manfit.. stly in tlwir favor that reasonable
minds could not seP it tlw otlwr way is a poinh'd
rommt>ntary of the ability of tlw human mind to
rationalize in its own interPst. It is equally so
upon the desirability and propriety of re::-;olving
any doubts in favor of permitting courts and
jurit>s to sPttle ::mch disputes rather than ruling
upon tlwm summarily as \\·as dorn' hPrP."

In Fredrrick May ((?: Co. L Dunn, 13 etah 2d 40,
:~(i8 P.:2d :2!i() ( 19G:2) whiC'h involwd an action for a
hrokPr's eo1mnission on th<> salP of stoek. Th(• eomt
stat<><l at pag-P :2(i.~:
"To sustain a srnnmary judgment, the plPa<lings, PvidPrn'P, admissions and inferenees then.. from, vit•\\·Pd most f avorabl~- to thP losPI", must
sho"· that ther<> is no genuin<> issue of material
faet, and that Uw winrn~r is (:>ntitled to a judg11wnt as a rnattPr of law. Such showing must
pn•clude, as a matter of la\\·, all reasonable possibility that th<' lm;f'r <'ould win if givPn a trial."
Tlw court went on to point out that where there arP
complicated 11. gal issuPs prest-nted l'Vt>n wlwn tlwre is
nothing in thP n•rorcl to indieate that oth<>r PvidPnf'P
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would lw adduced, it is a "wist' policy for tlw trial court
to dPny smimiar>; judg1nent" and <letenninP tlw issrn·s
h>- trial.
'Tlw case of Pleire Construction Co. r. Frankli11
Sational his. Co., 11 Utah 2d 403, 360 P.2d G99 (1961),
involved thP rPvenw of the situation presently hPfore
this court. In that case the dPfendant insuranc<' company was granted a summary judgment upon tlw ground
that as a matter of law the damaged property "·as under
the care, custody and control of the insurer and was,
then·fore, within the exclusion of tht- liability policy.
This court, in reversing the lower court's summary
judgment, held there 'vas a question of fact rPlatiw to
the actual care, custody and control of the prorwrty hy
tlw insnn·d at thP timP of the firP, sayin~:

" ... '11 her<'fore, Pl ewe is not precluded from
maintaining in this suit that it did not have the
'eare, custody or c·ontrol' of the property where
all the fin• damage occurTPd. It is necessary that
the isslw bP resolwd before it can he determined
whether, and to what Pxtent, its payment to
Cudahy was coverwl h>' its polic>' with tlw d<>frndant Franklin.
"In view of tJw faet that it cannot he said
to elearly ap1war that Ple\n' could not in any
!'Vent estahlish a right to recover, the order granting smnmary judgmPnt was improper. It is spt
asidP and the cam;e rt-rnandPd for trial."

CONCLrSIOX
'rhis is a substantial controversy. The claim of Prudential against the several defendants PX Ct> eds $1,000,000.
'rhe <lefrnse costs claimed by Fullmer Brothers are
$!50,000.

The lower court without a trial summarily determined Pacific Indemnity Company was obligated to def end the Prudential suit even though the present record
sN ms to compel the opposite result. 'rhP judg11wnt of thP
lo\\·Pr <'ourt should lw I'l'VPl"s<'d.
1

R0spertfully suhmittPd,
SKEEX,WORSLEY,SNOW
& CHRISTENSEN
701 Continental Bank Buildin~
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defpndant and
. I fJ JH'll on t

